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INTRODUCTION 
It would be a very useful task to detail for each alleged 
purpose or function the actual mechanism of operation 
of the terror process leading to the supposed result. To 
our knowledge this has never been attempted.1 
The task is to explain why terrorism works. If it did not produce in-
tended results — at least some of the time — then it would cease to be a 
political strategy. Terrorism without efficacy would then only be an ex-
pression of some destructive pathology. 
Terrorism is here defined as the threat of or use of illegal violence to 
weaken a hated political authority.2 The political authority can be a 
government, party, minority, class, race, religion, region, or any com-
bination of the above. By definition, terrorism works when the target of 
terrorism acts in such a manner that the target either loses public support 
for its political position or lessens its own political capabiUties. Terrorists 
cannot weaken the hated political authority by their own actions. 
Terrorism is a strategy of the weak.1 If those wanting to weaken a 
hated political authority were strong, they would not use terrorism as 
their main strategy because successful terrorism depends entirely upon 
the actions of the target. The target, in effect, has control of the situa-
tion. Therefore, if those wanting to weaken a hated political authority 
are strong, they will use strategies for which the outcome is more within 
their own control. The outcomes of coups, revolutions, and guerrilla 
wars are in some measure in the hands of plotters, revolutionaries and 
guerrillas. Such is not the case with terrorists. Theoretically, every ter-
rorist action can be defeated by the target of terror.4 
If successful terrorism depends on the target's action, then to ex-
plain successful terrorism one should study the behavior of the target and 
not the behavior of the terrorists. The key question, therefore, is why 
does a target act in such a way as to weaken itself and thereby make ter-
rorism efficacious? 
To attempt to answer this question, one must examine what the ter-
rorists want the target to do to weaken itself and then proceed to analyze 
why the target responds that way. This paper presents five responses that 
targets can take that will weaken their political authority:3 (1) over-
reaction; (2) power deflation; (3) failed repression of moderates; (4) ap-
peasement of moderates; and (5) massive intimidation. For each 
response, a hypothesis will be offered explaining why the target responds 
in such a way as to weaken itself. Three key variables seemingly affect 
each of the five responses, namely: (1) the target's perception of self; (2) 
the target's perception of the terrorists; and (3) the relative capabiUties of 
both self and terrorists. 
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The value of this exploratory study is twofold. On the one hand, the 
findings will help terrorists to be more successful. If terrorists know how 
a target is predisposed to respond, they they can tailor their terrorism to 
manipulate the target's perception coercing the target into a response 
which will weaken it. Knowledge is a basis of power. This knowledge 
can, on the other hand, also be used by the targets of terrorism to thwart 
terrorism. If a target understands the perceptions which will lead to the 
response coinciding with the purpose of the terrorists, then the target can 
alter its perceptions and respond in a different way. By doing so, the 
target "wins" because the terrorists have utterly failed to elicit the 
desired response. The behavior of the terrorists will be seen as irrational 
violence or a hollow threat and they will have been weakened themselves. 
The only way to make terrorists "lose" is to understand when, how, and 
why terrorism works. 
THE THEORY OF OVER-REACTION 
Over-reaction by a target, whether subject to regime or insurgent 
terrorism, is a familiar pattern of behavior. The loss of public support is 
inevitable. 
The target's indiscriminate use of force injures the innocent who 
believe that the injury is unjustified and, whether overtly or not, con-
demn the target. This condemnation makes the injured innocent recep-
tive to recruitment by the terrorists. In January 1984, the Amal in 
Lebanon used terrorism to provoke the Christians into shelling Shiite 
villages in order to politicize the Shiite population further, to de-
legitimize the Christian regime, and to recruit fighters. 
Even those not directly injured will see the target's over-reaction as 
violating the legitimate rules of politics. The use of force on others will 
be seen as a threat to oneself. As Carlos Marighela wrote, in over-
reacting the target has transformed "a country's political situation to a 
military one."6 The denial of civil rights without cause, another over-
reaction, will be interpreted as protecting the target and not the people,7 
and if the target over-reacts with ostentatious protective measures, the 
political stature of and the threat from the terrorists is magnified. This 
sets the stage for a drama where the protective measures become not an 
effective deterrent, but a challenge for the terrorists to overcome. Sym-
bolically, overcoming even a single challenge confers great prestige.' For 
instance, Qaddafi's defiance of the U.S. and the Sixth Fleet off the Li-
byan coast in January and April 1986 made him a folk hero to many 
Arabs and made the Palestinian cause more salient. If the target can be 
made to over-react by bringing a repugnant third party into the struggle, 
then terrorists can reap the public's disaffection. When provoked by the 
initial insurgent violence encouraged by Tanzania, Idi Amin did not help 
his legitimacy by bringing in Libyans and Palestinians to form his 
praetorian guard. Amin was a target who over-reacted. In the eyes of the 
public, these kinds of over-reactions make the target the enemy and, by 
contrast, make the terrorists friends.9 
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Over-reactions can also result in a lessening of the target's 
capabilities. Counter-terrorism can be very expensive in terms of money, 
attention, equipment, and labor. Over-reaction usually results in even 
greater costs, possibly turning a target away from the political, 
economic, and social activities that could produce more popular support. 
The reason for a target's over-reaction may be found in the follow-
ing hypothesis: 
When a target perceives itself to be righteous, the ter-
rorists to be the epitome of evil, and the relative 
capability in terms of force as overwhelmingly favoring 
itself, then a target is likely to over-react. 
The perception of oneself as 'good' and the terrorists as 'evil' may 
prompt great efforts to crush the terrorists. Stereotyping and dehumaniz-
ing an enemy, as Lifton and other psychologists have postulated, permits 
'good' to produce a massive counterforce to combat 'evil'.10 The phrase 
"the only good gook, is a dead gook," was often heard among American 
GIs in Vietnam. Such a perception of the enemy sanctioned free-fire zones, 
the burning of villages, and worse. The Soviets in Afghanistan likewise see 
their contest as being one between good and evil. The "progressive" and 
"popular" forces confront those labeled "reactionary," "feudal" and 
"agents of American imperialism," and thus all-out use of force can be 
justified. Note, too, how Israelis and Palestinians perceive each other, pro-
ducing a history of constant over-reaction by both parties. 
While self-righteousness and a challenge by the forces of evil pro-
vide a motive for indiscriminate strikes at those who dare to use violence 
against 'good,' it is the perception of great relative capability which per-
mits the target confidently to order the massive use of force. This may 
seem obvious when the regime is the target, less so when insurgents or 
potential insurgents are the target. Regimes usually have an overwhelm-
ing advantage in force and terrorism, it must be remembered, is the 
strategy of the weak. Therefore, when insurgents become the target, 
regime terrorism indicates the relative weakness of the regime. The 
regime then uses terrorism to provoke the opposition to over-react, 
pushing the opposition to use its robust capabilities thus reducing its 
popular support or depleting its force capabilities. For example, growing 
international support in the 1970s has given the PLO a feeling of great 
and growing power." In response, Israel was able to provoke mainline 
PLO groups to engage in indiscriminate action in order to discredit the 
Palestinian cause and to expose PLO forces to "justified" retaliation. 
Certainly, over-reaction is made more likely when the target sees itself as 
powerful and able to inflict a lesson upon an unworthy foe. 
Another illustration of this point appears in Benedict J. Kerkvliet's 
excellent study of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines. During the early 
stages of the rebellion in the 1930s the peasants protested, raided 
granaries of landlords, and began to organize. 
Peasants ... viewed their movement in terms of mutual 
protection against landlords and government officials. 
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When they protested alone or in small numbers, 
peasants were liable to be evicted, be arrested, or suffer 
other reprisals; when they acted in large numbers, they 
were less vulnerable.12 
At this stage the peasants did not want the landlords and government of-
ficials to over-react for the peasants themselves would be the victims. 
However, the situation illustrates that a vast power imbalance induces 
over-reactions. 
The Huk case also illustrates that the perception of good versus evil 
provides a basis for over-reaction. "A common belief among local and 
national government officials," Kerkvliet relates, "was that the peasant 
movement was subversive, communistic, and manipulated by a few 
clever leaders."13 Orders were given more than once to shoot peasants 
during strikes and to demolish their houses. These over-reactions, 
though not provoked by a conscious peasant strategy at this point, did 
result in a loss of political support for government authorities, a quicken-
ing of peasant mobilization, and weakening of the legitimacy of the 
Philippine Constabulary. 
THEORY OF POWER DEFLATION 
Arguably, a target that is incapable of responding to terrorism will 
lose public support and lessen its capabilities and confidence to thwart 
terrorism in the future. The inability of a target to respond is manifested 
a number of ways. If the target, usually a regime though sometimes an 
insurgent group, cannot protect its people, then it will lose legitimacy. 
The same result occurs when terrorists are allowed to choose the timing 
and the victims of their strikes without hindrance and then successfully 
collect ransom, release prisoners, have manifestos read by or printed in 
the media, destroy symbols, and/or injure or kill victims. If they can 
completely avoid retaliation, particularly if the target is obviously seek-
ing retaliation, the success of the terrorists is even greater and made plain 
for all to see. What Thornton calls "disorientation" is clearly seen in the 
behavior of the target. It is bad theatre for the target,14 and the terrorists, 
supposedly weak, seem to be in control. 
The British had great difficulty in dealing with the Sons of Liberty 
who perpetrated the Boston Tea Party in the early stages of the American 
Revolution. The same target exhibited disorientation when faced with 
the always symbolic and sometimes brutal attacks by the Irgun Zvai 
Leumi in Palestine. Another example occurred in a spectacular terrorist 
act in 1978 in Nicaragua. Eden Pastora and a handful of Sandinista 
fighters seized the National Legislative Palace in Managua, kidnapping 
almost the entire congress. President Somoza believed he had no choice 
but to fulfil Pastora's demands. With released prisoners, Pastora and his 
men made a triumphant exit through the streets to the airport and safe 
departure. Each of these are examples of successful insurgent terrorism 
against target regimes. Examples also exist of the reverse situation. Che 
Guevara, for instance, found himself unable to shake the role of the 
'hunted' as the Bolivian military, assisted by the CIA, acted as the 
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hunter. As the target of regime terror — Bolivian authorities violated the 
rules of warfare including the murder of Che himself — Che found that 
he was incapable of protecting his people or fulfilling his task of organiz-
ing a revolution. 
Since the function of political authorities centers on protecting peo-
ple and controlling the policy-making process, those authorities who fail 
in these tasks lose their legitimacy as authorities. The more failures, the 
more their power deflates. 
What makes targets of terrorism incapable of dealing with the ter-
rorists is a question which may be addressed by the following hypothesis: 
When a target perceives itself doing its duty while both 
harassed by its enemies and lacking the public support it 
thinks it deserves; perceives the terrorists as a clever, 
formidable foe with some logic, legitimacy, or justice on 
its side; and perceives the relative capability in terms of 
force "as generally favorable overall to itself but in this 
particular case weakened by a lack of intelligence or 
viable police/military options, then a target will likely 
be unable to act against the terrorists. 
Paul Wilkinson sees terrorism as "a strategy most suited to national 
liberation struggles against foreign rulers used by relatively small con-
spiratorial movements lacking any power base."11 In these cases the 
target, often relying on civilian and military bureaucrats, sees itself doing 
a dirty, difficult job without the public support it merits. This alone, 
makes definite policy difficult to formulate. Bold policy may out-pace 
fragile public support by incurring huge costs, such as the killing of inno-
cent bystanders. Combine this debilitating plight of the target with a 
perception that the terrorists are a rather clever, resourceful lot who 
firmly believe in their cause and tactics, and serious difficulties arise for 
the target. A further reason for caution exists. The terrorists may well be 
serious, dedicated fighters who will skillfully match the target's action 
with spectacular reaction. To act is to invite embarrassment and danger. 
Reprisals would be swift and to over-react may further enshrine the ter-
rorists' cause. Finally, the terrorists create situations where options for 
action all have greater costs than benefits to the target. The first difficul-
ty may be identifying and finding the terrorists. Usually the intelligence 
service is hampered by a public who gives the terrorists sanctuary and 
anonymity. This allows the terrorists to surprise the target, striking 
where and when the target is the least prepared to respond and where the 
terrorists enjoy multiple options not available to the target. 
These points are illustrated by the British experience in Palestine. 
Menachem Begin, in his book The Revolt, gives one of the most forceful 
legitimizations for terrorism:" Irgun violence would force the British to 
confront the plight of the Jews, unite the Jews in revolt, provoking Arab 
violence in order to impose substantial costs upon the British for social 
control, and so disorient British policy in Palestine that Britain would 
quit the scene. By February 1947, the British found Palestine "increas-
ingly out of control," with Arabs and Jews polarized and themselves 
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without the power either to resolve the dispute or to partition the land." 
Britain had run out of options, save one: it turned the problem over to 
the United Nations. 
THE THEORY OF FAILED REPRESSION OF MODERATES 
Frequently, the terrorists' target may choose to attack not only the 
terrorists but the moderate, non-violent opposition as well. If the target 
is a regime, it can ban political parties, institute censorship, increase 
surveillance, arrest and incarcerate protesters, and even kill moderates as 
examples of the costs of opposition. If the target is an insurgent group, it 
can kidnap, bomb, and assassinate the moderates both in the regime and 
in the non-violent opposition to the regime. The repression does not 
paralyze the moderates if insufficient or inefficient force is used; instead 
of moving away from the terrorists, the moderates do the opposite. They 
conclude that moderation is untenable and to protect themselves from 
the target they go to the side of the original terrotists, usually seen as the 
lesser of two evils. The target has converted mild opposition into militant 
opposition and weakened itself by absorbing the physical and mental 
costs of repression. 
The Shah of Iran, for example, increasingly repressed moderates in 
the 1970s. It did not work. One reason, among many, for its failure was 
the Shah's vacillation in carrying through with either reforms or repres-
sion. At least in part, this can be attributed to U.S. human rights opposi-
tion, to the Shah's personal weakness, and to an inept SAVAK in-
telligence service. Vacillation made the Shah appear weak and allowed a 
large coalition to form against him. Eventually the bazaar, the mosque, 
the modern business sector, and the intellectuals united in militance 
against the monarchy with the small existing terrorist groups. 
Repressing moderates had actually worked for the Shah on earlier 
occasions. As Barry Rubin described it: 
The shah must have remembered his success in riding 
out the 1962-63 upheaval over the White Revolution 
and, earlier, in co-opting opposition elements after 
Mossadegh's fall. On these two occasions, he had crack-
ed down hard and then proceeded to separate moderates 
from radicals, winning over some of the former, 
eliminating the latter. That strategy would fail this time, 
first because the charismatic Khomeini was able to keep 
the moderates in line and second because the fence sit-
ters gradually became convinced that the shah would 
fall. On the earlier occasions, the hopelessness of dissent 
had led the protesters to surrender. This time, the 
hopelessness of the shah's position caused those in the 
middle to cast their lot with the revolution." 
Contemporaneously, the same pattern occurred in Nicaragua with 
Anastasio Somoza. When the Chamber of Commerce and the Catholic 
Church, suffering repression, aligned with the FSLN, it was apparent 
that Somoza's legitimacy had all but vanished. 
12 
Conflict Quarterly 
Examples of insurgent targets repressing moderates include the 
Tupamaros in Uruguay. Although they succeeded in militarizing the 
regime after a number of successful power deflation operations, the 
Tupamaros' own response to regime terror disaffected moderates. Their 
excesses of violence brought the non-violent, moderate opposition and 
the military into a strange arrangement that eventually resulted in the 
restoration of democracy. The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of 
Peru, target of the counter-terrorism of the Guardia Civil, character-
istically repressed the moderate peasant opposition and thereby widened 
support for the regime. A very unusual case involved the Black Panther 
Party in the United States. Targeted by the FBI and local police 
authorities, Black Panther violence and militant rhetoric so disaffected 
moderate blacks that the Panthers found themselves increasingly 
isolated. In 1971 the Black Panthers disavowed violence, in effect 
recognizing that repressing moderates divided and weakened the Pan-
thers and the black movement. 
Asking why targets attempt to repress moderates, weakening 
themselves and strengthening the terrorists or counter-terrorists leads 
one to a third hypothesis: 
When the target perceives itself to be absolutely besieg-
ed to the point where it must act to preserve its authori-
ty; perceives the terrorists or counter-terrorists as 
threatening all that the target holds dear — with the 
main source of the threat the duping of moderate 
elements to ally with the extremist aims of the terrorists; 
and perceives the relative capability as favorable in 
terms of force but on the brink of a radical reversal if 
the moderates are allowed to combine with the ter-
rorists; then the target is likely to repress moderates in 
order to prevent this coalition. 
Repressing moderates is an eleventh hour gamble to preserve 
authority. The target believes that instituting reforms or buying off the 
opposition will not suffice. Repression is an act of desperation, and as 
such, has a high probability of failure. However, at this point there may 
seem to be no other option. The terrorists or counter-terrorists are on the 
brink of victory. They have duped the moderates. 
Again, the Iranian case can be used the illustrate this point. Accor-
ding to Rubin, in mid-1978 the Shah viewed the protesters as people 
"who are easily instigated. They hear a few words and immediately they 
are electrified and stop thinking."" Frustrated that neither reforms nor 
mild repression seemed to work, and bolstered by Zbigniew Brzezinski's 
personal assurances of U.S. support, the Shah approved a full-scale 
assault on the moderate opposition. On September 8, 1978, "Black Fri-
day," the military massacred about 1,000 protesters in Tehran's central 
Jaleh Square. The moderate opposition, led by Shariat-Madari, declared 
it would no longer cooperate with the reformist officials of the Shah's 
regime. A revolutionary situation crystallized.20 
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Whereas target over-reaction may be seen as an act of omnipotence 
and self-confidence, repressing moderates stems from frustration, anger, 
and anxiety. These emotions lead to irrational and desperate actions. 
THEORY OF APPEASING MODERATES 
Vigorous political reforms, which appease moderates, alienate the 
avid supporters of the old order. These supporters can move into the 
camp of the irreconcilable opposition. For example, when Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau made major reforms on behalf of French Cana-
dians on the issues of language and political appointments, a substantial 
number of English-speaking Canadians considered these actions as 
nothing more than a dastardly appeasement of the Front de Liberation 
du Quebec (FLQ). Concessions seemed to be a reward for planting 
bombs and blowing up Canadians. Similarly, allowing the unionization 
of workers and collective bargaining in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries was viewed by doctrinaire capitalists in many industrializ-
ed countries as surrendering to the perpetrators of strikes and labor 
violence. 
Reforms also result in political devolution that weakens the old 
order as power is given up or diffused through sharing it with former op-
position elements. Granting self-rule or sovereignty to province or col-
ony, enfranchising the lower class, granting minority rights, establishing 
welfare programs, and instituting a functioning legislature all reduce the 
political power of the ancien regime. How different the power of the cur-
rent Spanish government is from that under the rule of Franco; how 
much hope is placed upon the Anglo-Irish Agreement on Northern 
Ireland as the start of altering its one-sided political authority? The 
history of the growth of democracy is the history of reforms induced by 
violence and the threat of more violence. 
There can be valid reasons for appeasing moderates by the use of 
reforms: 
When a target perceives itself as a legitimate political 
authority but one which has made mistakes in the past; 
perceives the terrorists as capitalizing on these mistakes 
and attracting growing popular support for radical solu-
tions that go far beyond remedying past mistakes; and 
perceives the relative capability as overwhelmingly 
favorable to itself but liable to deteriorate the longer the 
struggle continues; then targets are likely to appease 
moderates. 
The target that appeases moderates is usually a regime, although, as the 
Black Panther case illustrates, insurgents can appease a moderate op-
position through reforms as well. 
The target institutes reforms partly because it is just, but more par-
ticularly because reforms co-opt the potential or actual mass base of the 
terrorists. Reforms remove the injustices that stimulated the terrorism in 
the first place. Reforms remove the cause of terrorism but, as Walter 
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Laqueur points out, this does not end terrorism.21 What it may ac-
complish is the isolation of the radicals and habitual terrorists from the 
mass of the people who dislike the risk of disorder and violence, especial-
ly if such must be borne for no apparent cause. Isolated and desperate, 
the terrorist leaders can be hunted down, tried, convicted and in-
carcerated. They lose the sanctuary provided by the moderates and 
perhaps their conviction that they represent the true interests of the 
masses. 
Perhaps to refer to this process of reform as 'successful terrorism' is 
to mislabel it. Yet the hated political authority is weakened in line with 
the professed aims of the terrorists. Terrorism has worked even when the 
terrorists were dead, in jail, or struggling to stay alive in basements or in 
the mountains. 
Historians may well recognize the skill and determination of Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau in defusing the terrorism engaged in on behalf 
of French Canadians. Eventually his policies defused separatism as well. 
Trudeau was fully aware of the injustices inflicted upon French Cana-
dians, arguing that: 
In the matter of education as well as political rights, the 
safeguards so dear to French Canadians were nearly 
always disregarded throughout the country, so that they 
came to believe themselves secure only in Quebec. 
Worse still, in those areas not specifically covered by the 
constitution, the English-speaking majority used its size 
and wealth to impose a set of social rules humiliating to 
French Canadians.22 
The Prime Minister instituted a classic two-pronged attack on mili-
tant separatism. The passage of the Official Languages Act, introduced 
in October 1968, allowed Canadians to use either English or French in 
their dealings with the federal government, easing the way for French 
Canadians to operate politically in all of Canada. Almost as important 
for appeasing French Canadian moderates were reforms in the area of 
political recruitment. Trudeau opened up the public service to more 
French Canadians. By 1976 the percentage of public service officials 
speaking French as a first language had risen from an insignificent 
number to over 20%." The best and brightest of French Canadians were 
appointed to high political positions in Ottawa so that the federal 
government represented both French and English Canadians. 
In conjunction with these reforms was the firm suppression of the 
FLQ, especially after the 1970 kidnappings of British trade commissioner 
James Cross and Quebec Labor and Immigration Minister Pierre 
Laporte who was assassinated while in captivity. Trudeau invoked the 
War Measures Act and approved arrests, saying "It is more important to 
maintain law and order than to worry about those whose knees tremble 
at the sight of the army."24 This firmness induced the moderates to re-
nounce violence, and his reforms helped the moderates to be loyal Cana-
dians. Pursuing the one prong without the other would have been a 
disaster. Reforms without firmness would have made Ottawa seem 
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cringing and without authority while firmness without reforms would 
have made Ottawa appear unjust and brutal. Isolated, many FLQ 
members abandoned terrorism in favor of continuing the separatist 
struggle at the electoral level. That, too, failed. The Parti Québécois won 
the 1976 Quebec provincial election but it had no mandate for separa-
tion. 
It must not be forgotten that terrorism and the French Canadian 
issue created a political climate that helped put Trudeau in office and 
mobilized support for his reforms. Wise political authorities take ter-
rorism seriously and take it to indicate that a legitimate problem exists 
that requires immediate attention. Terrorists are not crazy. Terrorists do 
not risk their lives without an initial cause. Therefore, terrorism can 
spark needed reform and weaken an over-bearing target. 
THEORY OF MASSIVE INTIMIDATION" 
Those who are intimidated into inaction or obedience will neither 
keep nor build public support because having been so intimidated they 
cannot serve others — cannot protect, provide or promote. Intimidated 
by Stalin's great purge and terror begun in 1936, fewer and fewer young 
communists rallied to the side of the old Bolsheviks. The S.A. [Stur-
mabteilung] under Ernst Rohm ceased being a political force after 
Hitler's terror of 1934 liquidated its leadership. Insurgent terrorists, too, 
have used intimidation. When Castro and his 26th July Movement 
demoralized Batista's police and military forces, compelling them to 
relinquish the area around their base in the Sierra Maestra in late 1958, 
Batista's regime lost legitimacy. For those in the immediate area, Castro 
was the one who determined who got what, when, and how. He had 
authority. For Cuba generally, Castro appeared to be the force with 
which to be reckoned in the future. 
As Abram de Swaan points out in "Terror as Government Service," 
the target weakens itself by deciding not to act." Unlike power deflation, 
where the target is unable to respond to terrorism, intimidation comes 
when the target is able to respond but does not. The target exhibits the 
absence of any political energy. One might postulate: 
When a target sees itself as uncertain in his or her con-
victions and risking a chance of extreme punishment for 
political actions in an unpredictable situation; perceives 
the terrorists as dedicated in their aim and more than 
willing to use violence in its pursuit; perceives relative 
capability as favoring reasonable people like themselves 
under normal conditions but perceives the conditions to 
be abnormal because the terrorists can kill or out-
maneuver at whim; then the target will be intimidated 
and not act even though it may have great or potentially 
great capabilities. 
De Swaan sees torture by regimes as designed 
... [T]o spread an ever-present fear, of arrest, of ill-
treatment, of mutilation, of betrayal, of death. The 
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purpose of all this is that people will ask themselves with 
every action whether their deeds do not create risks for 
themselves and for the people around them, that they 
will not just abstain from what is forbidden, but will 
avoid whatever has not expressly been allowed. They 
really must continually try to imagine what the rulers 
would want them to do, they must become vicarious 
rulers for themselves. Only then the completion of the 
terrorist regime has been achieved." 
This analysis is so perceptive that it is worth continuing at some length. 
If everyone would know [for certain] what acts would 
lead to arrest and torture and which would go unpunish-
ed, most people would refrain from the first and 
without worrying, commit the others. But the purpose 
of an intimidation apparatus is precisely to impose so 
much fear in that of their own account they will abstain 
from things that otherwise would be hard for the regime 
to detect or prevent. Not even a police state can always 
keep under surveillance all people in all their doings. 
And because the regime cannot enforce its own com-
mands and prohibitions, fully or even partially, it must 
create a negative game of chance, which leaves it to the 
citizens to avoid the risks.2' 
Intimidation works when the target experiences fear and feels 
vulnerable. Such results are not enough, however, for they do not ex-
plain martyrs or the behavior of those who stand up to overwhelming 
force even when they are certain they will be punished. Strong convic-
tions, when upheld under public witness, inhibit intimidation. In de 
Swann's words, those with strong convictions do not "become vicarious 
rulers for themselves." They are self-ruled. 
One of the greatest ironies of history is that Stalin had to kill so 
many people in his attempt to intimidate opponents or potential op-
ponents. He could induce fear; he could make people feel vulnerable; yet 
he was dealing with people who were believers in Marx and Lenin. Many 
had firm convictions. The show trials and false confessions hid the fact 
that the overwhelming majority of the old, and some new, Bolsheviks 
went to their deaths defiant and unintimidated. The easily intimidated 
new generation which filled the shoes of the purged knew enough to take 
its convictions from Stalin's cues. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Each hypothesis postulated demonstrates that terrorism is ef-
ficacious only if the target makes it so. Terrorism demands that the 
target perform and induces a test of the target's competence, whether the 
target is a regime or an insurgent group. The behavior of the target is 
critical to understanding why terror works because terrorism's purpose is 
to elicit a particular kind of behavior that weakens the target. The 
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target's perceptions, as the five hypotheses have illustrated, provide the 
basis of the target's behavior. Therefore, while the causes of terrorism, 
those of the terrorist's behavior, are largely sociological, the success or 
failure of terrorism, determined by the target's behavior, is largely 
psychological. Terrorists must comprehend or manipulate the target's 
psychological perceptions inducing the target to act in the way it is 
predisposed to act. Thus, a powerful, self-righteous target confronting 
terrorism perpetrated by the forces of absolute evil can best be made to 
over-react, but not easily made to power deflate, repress moderates, ap-
pease moderates, or be intimidated. 
Of course, a powerful, self-righteous target confronting terrorism 
perpetrated by the forces of absolute evil does not have to over-react. 
Knowledge of one's own perceptions, and how they can be manipulated, 
makes one aware of the propensity for making particular mistakes. Pru-
dent targets do not behave as automatons. 
Successful terrorism leads to a different kind of political struggle 
because it changes the relative capability of the contestants. The target is 
weakened and the terrorists are strengthened. Political strategies are 
always dependent upon relative capabilities. Those who have developed 
substantial relative capabilities will not continue to rely on a strategy of 
terrorism. Terrorism is not only a strategy of the weak, it is also a weak 
strategy. It cannot "finish off" an opponent, cannot overthrow a 
government, cannot bring national liberation, cannot reform a culture, 
and cannot do anything by itself except shift the power balance. Having 
developed relative capabilities, the former terrorists can control other 
strategies such as negotiation, revolution, coup d'état, or electioneering, 
making them able to produce substantial political results. 
Finally, the development of theories on the efficacy of terrorism 
reveals a strategy which put some targets into impossible dilemmas. A 
large moderate, non-violent opposition movement in conjunction with a 
terrorist movement forces the target to deal with the underlying issues 
which fuel the opposition. The target can ignore a large, moderate, non-
violent opposition or grant it meaningless concessions without much fear 
of retribution. Faced with a terrorist movement alone, the target can 
crush it. When the two groups operate together, however, the target must 
either repress the moderates or appease them. Repression drives the 
moderates toward the terrorists. Ignoring the moderates will be seen as 
repression because of the difficulty in compartmentalizing anti-terrorist 
actions, directing the solely at the terrorists. Both terrorists and 
moderates will feel the 'chill' of repression. Repression radicalizes and 
militarizes the moderates. The only other option left to the target is to 
appease the moderates through reforms. As Gandhi and King well knew, 
the rejection of non-violent mass action by the target is really a 
preference of the target for a violent struggle, complete with all the costs 
and risks that struggle entails. Targets which generally avoid using 
strategies of violence are forced to reform. Targets that prefer violence 
will not be moved to reform by non-violent protests; they will repress. In 
1933 and 1934, the non-violent strategies of Hitler's opponents failed 
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because Hitler, in control of the government, had few inhibitions against 
using violence. The British in India, on the other hand, had some major 
inhibitions. The results of the two cases are patently different. 
The literature on terrorism has principally dealt with either its causes 
or, in the popular press, with its immorality. There has been a reluctance 
to examine its usefulness as political strategy. This study forms a 
preliminary effort to analyze its over-all efficacy. 
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